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PRIMARY LIABILITY AMONGST SECONDARY ACTORS:  WHY 
THE SECOND CIRCUIT’S “BRIGHT LINE” STANDARD SHOULD 
PREVAIL 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In today’s widely traded securities market, the need for fair and honest 
disclosure is imperative. The investing public has a right to such disclosure and 
often relies on federal regulation to ensure it.  Nonetheless, there are, 
unfortunately, times when such honesty is compromised. When this occurs, 
those at fault should be held liable, whether they are primary or secondary 
actors. 
Section 10(b) and Rule 10(b)(5) of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act 
prohibit any person from making deceptive, untrue or inaccurate statements or 
failing to disclose necessary information in connection with the purchase or 
sale of any security.1 Even in light of Section 10(b) and Rule 10(b)(5), 
however, courts have disagreed about the appropriate standard of liability to be 
imposed upon secondary actors such that they will be found primarily liable 
when such unfortunate circumstances arise. In fact, a definite split in the 
circuits has developed. The Ninth Circuit has adopted the broad standard of 
imposing liability upon secondary actors based upon their “substantial 
participation.”2 The Second Circuit, rather, has adopted a bright line standard, 
 
 1. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1997); Rules and 
Regulations, Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1998). 
 2. See, e.g., In re Software Toolworks Inc. Litig., 50 F.3d 615 (9th Cir. 1994); In re ZZZZ 
Best Sec. Litig., 864 F.Supp. 960 (C.D. Cal. 1994); Employers Ins. of Wassau v. Musick, Peeler, 
& Garrett, 871 F.Supp. 381 (S.D. Cal. 1994). 
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only imposing liability on secondary actors when the secondary actors make a 
misstatement or omission attributable to them.3 
Section II of this Note discusses the elimination of secondary liability, 
namely the abolition of aider and abettor liability, as well as conspiracy 
liability. Section III goes on to examine what remained after the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank4 and provides an 
overview of the Ninth and Second Circuit split regarding what type of conduct 
constitutes primary liability amongst secondary actors. Section IV provides an 
explanation of the differences between the Ninth Circuit’s “substantial 
participation” or “intricate involvement” standard and the Second Circuit’s 
“bright line” standard. Furthermore, Section IV establishes the superiority of 
the Second Circuit’s standard. Section V examines policy considerations which 
demonstrate the preeminence of the Second Circuit’s “bright line” standard.  
Finally, the Note concludes in Part VI, stating that while Central Bank may 
already provide the real answer to what type of activity constitutes primary 
liability amongst secondary actors, it will take another Supreme Court case to 
eliminate the current circuit split. 
II. THE END OF SECONDARY LIABILITY 
Although the need for securities regulation may be obvious today, such 
was not always the case.5 It was not until the beginning of the 20th century that 
“[t]he idea that the general public ha[d] an interest in the operations and 
performance of the stock market sufficient to justify public control of the 
exchanges” came into fruition.6 A want of federal regulations and a lack of 
uniformity in state legislation prior to this point provided breeding grounds for 
fraudulent and deceptive securities transactions.7 However, it was not until 
after the problem came to a head with the “Great Crash” of October 1929 that 
the necessary federal securities legislation came about.8 
 
 3. See, e.g., In re MTC Elec. Tech. Shareholders Litig., 898 F.Supp. 974 (E.D.N.Y. 1995); 
In re JWP Inc. Sec. Litig., 928 F.Supp. 1239 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Phillips v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 
933 F.Supp. 303 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), aff’d, 108 F.3d 1370 (2d Cir. 1997); Shapiro v. Cantor, 123 
F.3d 717 (2d Cir. 1997); Wright v. Ernst & Young, 152 F.3d 169 (2d Cir. 1998). 
 4. Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 511 U.S. 164 (1994). 
 5. See generally Steve Thel, The Original Conception of Section 10(b) of the Securities 
Exchange Act, 42 STAN. L. REV. 385, 394 (1990). 
 6. Id. 
 7. Kyle M. Globerman, The Elusive and Changing Definition of a Security: One Test Fits 
All, 51 FLA. L. REV. 271, 277 (1999) (Globerman noted the problems of the securities market 
prior to federal legislation, stating: “The absence of federal regulations and disparity in state 
legislation provided fertile ground for fraudulent and deceptive trading in securities leading to 
illusory market strength.”). 
 8. Id. at 278-80. 
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On May 27, 1933, the Securities Act9 was passed “to protect investors 
during the initial offering of a security.”10 The purpose of the Act was twofold: 
“to provide the investor with enough information to make a sound economic 
decision in purchasing a security, and to hold the issuers liable for any 
misstatements or any other fraudulent activities in the issuance of securities.”11 
Shortly thereafter, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Act”)12 was 
passed to regulate the trading of securities on the secondary market.13 Section 
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provides, in pertinent part, that it 
shall be unlawful for any person to directly or indirectly “use or employ, in 
connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a national 
securities exchange or any security not so registered, any manipulative or 
deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations 
as the Commission may prescribe.”14 Rule 10(b)(5) promulgated thereunder 
provides: 
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any 
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any 
facility of any national securities exchange, 
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, 
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a 
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of 
the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or 
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or 
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the 
purchase or sale of any security.15 
The original purpose of the 1934 Act was to regulate market manipulation 
and speculation.16 Today, the 1934 Act is the primary federal securities law to 
deal with fraud in the purchase and sale of securities. With the investing public 
as the intended beneficiaries of the 1934 Act, Section 10(b) of the Act, and 
Rule 10(b)(5) promulgated thereunder, were implemented to “proscribe[] 
knowing and intentional misconduct designed to deceive or defraud 
investors.”17 Due to the “extensive scheme of civil liability”18 created by the 
 
 9. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77(a) (1994). 
 10. Globerman, supra note 7, at 279. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78(a) (1994). 
 13. See Globerman, supra note 7, at 280. 
 14. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994). 
 15. Rules and Regulations, Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10(b)(5) 
(1998). 
 16. See Globerman, supra note 7, at 280. 
 17. Thel, supra note 5, at 386-87. 
 18. Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 511 U.S. 164, 171 (1994). 
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Act, Section 10(b) and Rule 10(b)(5) were to serve as “catchall”19 provisions. 
While neither Section 10(b) nor Rule 10(b)(5) provide an express remedy for 
private causes of action, federal courts have implied the existence of a private 
remedy for violations thereof.20 
A. The Elimination of Aider and Abettor Liability 
In 1994, the Supreme Court, in Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 
eliminated the private plaintiff’s aiding and abetting cause of action for 
securities fraud under Section 10(b).21  This holding frustrated the previously 
routine practice of suing the so-called “primary” violators of the statute, such 
as the issuers, officers or underwriters, as well as naming other professionals, 
such as accountants and lawyers, as aiders, abettors or co-conspirators.22 
Central Bank stated that although a private plaintiff may not maintain an 
aiding and abetting cause of action under Section 10(b), the absence of such 
liability does not mean that secondary actors in the securities market are 
“always free from liability under the securities Acts.”23 The Court noted that 
secondary actors may be held liable as primary violators, stating “[a]ny person 
or entity, including a lawyer, accountant, or bank, who employs a manipulative 
device or makes a material misstatement (or omission) on which a purchaser or 
seller of securities relies may be liable as a primary violator under [Rule] 10b-
5, assuming all of the requirements for primary liability under Rule 10b-5 are 
met.”24 
Furthermore, in 1995, Congress passed the Private Securities Litigation 
Reform Act (“PSLRA”), which explicitly gave the Securities Exchange 
Commission (“SEC”) authority to bring actions for aiding and abetting under 
the Securities Exchange Act.25 Such legislation evidences Congress’s approval 
of the elimination of the aider/abettor cause of action for private plaintiffs. 
Thus, it appears that as a result of both Central Bank and the PSLRA,26 the 
 
 19. Id. at 174 (quoting Chiarella v. U.S., 445 U.S. 222, 234-35 (1980), where the court 
stated: “Section 10(b) is aptly described as a catchall provision, but what it catches must be 
fraud.”). 
 20. Id. at 171. 
 21. See id. at 164. 
 22. Irwin J. Sugarman, Lawyers & Accountants Liability After Central Bank, G-79 A.B.A. 
CENTER FOR CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC. NAT’L INST. (1998). 
 23. Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 191. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified in 
scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
 26. Arthur Levitt, former Chairman of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, stated 
in his October 21, 1997, address before the Subcommittee on Finance and Hazardous Materials, 
that in the two years since implementation of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 
1995, the Staff Report had made various preliminary observations. One such observation was that 
“[s]econdary defendants, such as accountants and lawyers, were being named much less 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2000] PRIMARY LIABILITY AMONGST SECONDARY ACTORS 1611 
only remedy that remains available for private investors who have suffered a 
loss as a result of securities fraud is to allege a primary violation of Section 
10(b) or Rule 10(b)(5).27 The following sections explore the confusing 
question of what constitutes a “primary violation” amongst secondary actors. 
B. No Aiding and Abetting Also Means No Conspiracy 
Following Central Bank, private plaintiffs have attempted to hold 
secondary actors liable under Section 10(b) by alleging conspiracy charges, as 
opposed to aiding and abetting in the fraudulent misstatement or omission.28 
For example, in the class action suit of Dinsmore v. Squadron, Ellenoff, 
Plesent, Sheinfeld & Sorkin, plaintiffs alleged that the defendant law firm 
conspired to violate Section 10(b) and Rule 10(b)(5) by allegedly making 
material misstatements and omissions to the SEC during its representation of 
their client, Towers, and by drafting an offer of rescission to the plaintiffs on 
the client’s behalf.29 The Second Circuit refused to extend liability for 
conspiracy to violate Section 10(b) or Rule 10(b)(5), stating that “the reasoning 
leading to the Supreme Court’s rejection of aiding and abetting liability . . . 
also applies to conspiracy.”30 Furthermore, the court held that when the 
requirements for primary liability are not independently met, “they may not be 
 
frequently in federal securities class actions. It is unclear, however, whether this decline can be 
attributed primarily to the Reform Act or to the Supreme Court’s 1994 decision in the Central 
Bank of Denver case, which eliminated private liability for aiding and abetting in actions under 
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.” Testimony of Arthur Levitt, 1997 WL 
757725 (S.E.C.), at *3. 
 27. It is interesting to note that since Central Bank and the passage of the 1995 Private 
Securities Litigation Reform Act, litigation involving secondary actors has seemed to decline 
overall. Id. at *10 n.4. 
The staff’s review of complaints in the 105 class actions filed in 1996 revealed that 
accounting firms have been named in six cases, corporate counsel in no cases, and 
underwriters in 19 cases. By contrast, a report of the Big Six accounting firms concluded 
that the number of audit-related suits filed both in state and federal court against these 
firms for the years 1990 to 1992, was 192, 172, and 141 respectively, . . . although these 
numbers were not limited to securities class actions. Moreover, this report concluded that 
during these same years the number of cases either settled or dismissed against the Big 
Six firms which involved claims under Section 10(b) was 18, 35, and 58 respectively. . . . 
A study by the National Economic Research Associates reported that during the period 
1991 through June 1996, accountants were defendants in 52 reported settlements (as 
opposed to complaints), underwriters were defendants in 80, and law firms were 
defendants in seven. 
Id. 
 28. See Dinsmore v. Squadron, Ellenoff, Plesent, Sheinfeld & Sorkin, 135 F.3d 837 (2d Cir. 
1998); In re GlenFed, Inc. Sec. Litig., 60 F.3d 591 (9th Cir. 1995); Van de Velde v. Coopers & 
Lybrand, 899 F.Supp. 731 (D. Mass. 1995); Faleck & Margolies, Ltd. v. Margolies, No. 89 Civ. 
8548 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 30, 1995). 
 29. Dinsmore, 135 F.3d at 839. 
 30. Id. at 842. 
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satisfied based solely on one’s participation in a conspiracy in which other 
parties have committed a primary violation.”31 Other attempts by plaintiffs 
alleging conspiracy to violate Section 10(b) have also been unsuccessful.32 
III. PRIMARY LIABILITY UNDER SECTION 10(B)/ RULE 10(B)(5) 
A. What Constitutes Primary Liability? 
With aiding and abetting and conspiracy causes of action eliminated, the 
only remaining option for private plaintiffs seeking a remedy for violations of 
Section 10(b) and Rule 10(b)(5) is to allege a primary violation.33 However, 
just what constitutes a primary violation is far from settled. Although the 
general elements of primary liability are accepted throughout the circuits,34 the 
Ninth and Second Circuits have split when defining the type of conduct that 
constitutes a primary violation amongst secondary actors. There are also 
 
 31. Id. at 843. 
 32. See GlenFed, 60 F.3d at 592 (“The Court’s rationale [in Central Bank] precludes a 
private right of action for ‘conspiracy’ liability.”); Van de Velde, 899 F.Supp. at 738 (“To the 
extent that this constitutes a distinct claim for conspiracy to violate the securities laws, defendant 
is correct that this claim is barred by Central Bank.”); In re MTC Elec. Tech. Shareholders Litig., 
898 F.Supp. 974, 982 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (“[E]very reason cited by the Supreme Court, in rejecting 
the implied right of action for aiding and abetting also applies to actions alleging conspiracies.”); 
Faleck & Margolies, 1995 WL 33631 at *12 (“Since neither § 10(b), nor any other express cause 
of action under the 1934 Act, contains any statutory language making conspiracy to violate § 
10(b) a violation of the 1934 Act, the Supreme Court’s holding in Central Bank precludes such an 
action by plaintiffs” and “[t]o permit a private plaintiff to maintain an action for conspiracy to 
violate Rule 10b-5 would make Central Bank of Denver meaningless, since virtually every aiding 
and abetting claim can be alleged as a conspiracy claim.”). 
 33. See Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 191 (“Because the text of § 10(b) does not prohibit aiding 
and abetting, we hold that a private plaintiff may not maintain an aiding and abetting suit under § 
10(b). . . . Yet, [a]ny person or entity. . .who employs a manipulative device or makes a material 
misstatement (or omission) on which a purchaser or seller of securities relies may be liable as a 
primary violator under 10b-5, assuming all of the requirements for primary liability under Rule 
10b-5 are met.”); see also Dinsmore, 135 F.3d at 842 (“We emphasize that, while we decline to 
imply a cause of action for conspiracy to violate § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, secondary actors who 
conspire to commit such violations will still be subject to liability so long as they independently 
satisfy the requirements for primary liability.”). 
 34. The generally accepted elements of primary liability under Section 10(b)/Rule 10(b)(5) 
are: 
(1) a misrepresentation or omission, 
(2) of a material fact, 
(3) made with scienter, 
(4) that plaintiff relied upon, and 
(5) causing the plaintiff injury. 
See, e.g., Wright v. Ernst & Young, 152 F.3d 169, 177 (2d Cir. 1998); Anixter v. Home-Stake 
Prod. Co., 77 F.3d 1215, 1225 (10th Cir. 1996); Trust Co. of La. v. N.N.P., Inc., 104 F.3d 1478, 
1490 (5th Cir. 1997). 
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several other decisions outside of these two circuits which espouse one 
standard or the other, or some hybrid thereof. A discussion of these varying 
standards and the cases that developed them follows. 
B. The Ninth Circuit’s “Substantial Participation” or “Intricate 
Involvement” Standard 
Some courts, particularly those in the Ninth Circuit, have held that 
“substantial participation”35 or “intricate involvement”36 in the preparation of 
misrepresentations or omissions that are actually made or omitted by someone 
else is sufficient to create liability.37 
In one of the earliest Ninth Circuit cases to address this issue after Central 
Bank, the court in In re ZZZZ Best Securities Litigation,38 imposed liability 
upon a secondary actor who was “intricately involved” in the creation of the 
primary actor’s misstatements and in the “resulting deception.”39 In ZZZZ Best, 
investors brought a Section 10(b) and Rule 10(b)(5) securities fraud suit 
against the accounting firm of Ernst & Young, which prepared a Review 
Report and allegedly reviewed, created or issued several other statements 
related to the ZZZZ Best fraudulent scheme.40 The ZZZZ Best court extended 
liability despite the fact that the alleged misstatements “included [no] public 
 
 35. “Substantial participation,” as it relates to a secondary actor’s liability for 
misrepresentations or omissions made by the primary violator, is usually phrased in terms of the 
secondary actor’s “significant role” or “central role” in the misrepresentation or omission. See, 
e.g., In re Software Toolworks Inc. Litig., 50 F.3d 615, 628 n.3 (9th Cir. 1994) (stating that 
accounting firm could be held liable based on the “significant role [they played] in drafting and 
editing” a letter); Cashman v. Coopers & Lybrand, 877 F.Supp. 425, 432 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (stating 
that accountants may be primarily liable under Section 10(b) if they played a “central role in 
drafting and formation of the alleged misstatements”). Interestingly, “substantial” participation or 
assistance was also a phrase commonly used when determining aider/abettor liability prior to its 
elimination. See Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 181. 
 36. The term “intricate involvement” was first introduced in the case of In re ZZZZ Best 
Sec. Litig., where primary liability was imposed upon the defendant accounting firm, who 
prepared a review report and reviewed other statements of the primary violator, which according 
to the court, made the accounting firm “intricately involved” in the creation of misstatements 
made by the primary violator. In re ZZZZ Best Sec. Litig. 864 F.Supp. 960, 970 (C.D. Cal. 1994). 
 37. See Software Toolworks, 50 F.3d at 628 n.3 (stating that plaintiff’s complaint “clearly 
alleges” primary liability under Section 10(b) for the “significant role” the defendant accounting 
firm played in drafting and editing letters to the SEC which contained material misrepresentations 
and omissions); Adam v. Silicon Valley Bancshares, 884 F.Supp. 1398 (N.D. Cal. 1995) 
(Defendant accounting firm held primarily liable under Section 10(b) for misrepresentations made 
by the primary violator issuer in their financial statements and reports.); ZZZZ Best, 864 F.Supp. 
at 970 (Defendant accounting firm, a secondary actor, found primarily liable because “anyone 
intricately involved in their creation [the fraudulent material misrepresentations and omissions of 
the primary violator] . . . should be liable under Section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5”). 
 38. ZZZZ Best, 864 F.Supp. at 960. 
 39. Id. at 970. 
 40. Id. at 964. 
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indication within them that [Ernst & Young] had anything to do with their 
existence.”41 The court held that “liability under Section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5 is 
not limited to the making of materially false and misleading statements or 
omissions,”42 and imposed liability on Ernst & Young whose activity was 
“extensive enough.”43 The court noted, however, that the case “create[d] a 
close call.”44 
Shortly after the ZZZZ Best decision, the Ninth Circuit, in In re Software 
Toolworks Inc. Litig.,45 again imposed liability on an accounting firm for the 
“significant role” it played in participating in the preparation of its client’s 
allegedly misleading letter to the SEC. 46 Although the court only discussed the 
issue of primary liability in a footnote, defendant Deloitte & Touche was “not 
absolve[d]”47 of the issue of primary liability despite the fact that they only 
provided “extensive review and discussion”48 of letters their client sent to the 
SEC . 
The trend towards a broad reading of primary liability for secondary actors 
continued in the Ninth Circuit with Employers Ins. of Wausau v. Musick, 
Peeler, & Garrett.49 In Employers Ins., the court held both the accountants and 
the attorneys who participated in drafting their client’s prospectus liable.50 In 
finding the defendant attorneys liable, the court stated that “a secondary actor 
may be primarily liable under section 10(b) when the actor’s alleged 
participation consists mainly of drafting and editing an offering document.”51  
Furthermore, a secondary actor “may be liable for direct violation of the rule if 
its participation in the misrepresentation is direct.”52 In holding the accountants 
liable, the court paid no attention to the fact that the reports made were 
 
 41. Id. at 965. The court went on to state that “[n]one of these additional [mis]statements 
attributes its existence to E & Y or even hints that E & Y might have been involved in the 
issuance of any of those [mis]statements.” Furthermore, “Plaintiff’s complaint does not 
specifically identify which of the numerous defendants made which of the alleged 
misrepresentations alluded to in the complaint.  Thus, it is difficult to determine, based only on 
the complaint, exactly what E & Y alone is accused of doing.” Id. at n.5. Finally, “Plaintiffs 
essentially concede in their opposition papers that E & Y did not itself release the additional 
statements to the public.” Id. at n.7. 
 42. Id. at 972. 
 43. ZZZZ Best, 864 F.Supp. at 970. 
 44. Id. 
 45. In re Software Toolworks Inc. Litig., 50 F.3d 615 (9th Cir. 1994). 
 46. See id. at 628. 
 47. Id. at 628 n.3. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Employers Ins. of Wausau v. Musick, Peeler, & Garett, 871 F.Supp. 381 (S.D. Cal. 
1994). 
 50. See id. at 388-89. 
 51. Id. at 389. 
 52. Id. (quoting S.E.C. v. Seaboard Corp., 677 F.2d 1301, 1312 (9th Cir. 1982)). 
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uncertified, stating a “more flexible test,”53 as opposed to a “rigid rule,”54 was 
needed to “determine if an accountant has been sufficiently involved in an 
offering to be considered a primary actor under section 10(b).”55 
Expanding the standard yet again, a district court in California held that the 
defendant accountants had satisfied the “in connection with”56 requirement of 
Section 10(b), such that they could be held primarily liable, simply by their 
involvement in the misrepresentations made by their issuer client.57 In Adam v. 
Silicon Valley Bancshares, defendant Deloitte & Touche never made a 
fraudulent misrepresentation or omission itself,58 rather, plaintiffs alleged that 
Deloitte & Touche violated Section 10(b) by permitting Silicone Valley 
Bancshares to issue misleading financial statements and not “expand[ing] its 
audit procedures to accommodate”59 Silicone Valley Bancshares’ “critical 
weaknesses”60 in their internal controls and loan portfolio. In sum, the Adam 
court concluded that accountants could be held liable under Section 10(b) for 
their involvement in representations made by their client, even though it was 
claimed that Central Bank authorized a narrow interpretation of the “in 
connection with” the sale of securities requirement,61 so as to limit accountants 
exposure to certified financial statements contained in prospectuses.62 
In McGann v. Ernst & Young,63 the Ninth Circuit continued the practice of 
an expansive reading by again finding the defendant accounting firm liable for 
 
 53. Employers Ins., 871 F.Supp. at 389. 
 54. Id. (“[T]he court [will] not . . . create the rigid rule that an accountant must actually be 
named in a document to be liable as a primary actor.”). 
 55. Id. at 389. 
 56. See supra note 15. Section 10(b) provides that it shall be unlawful for any person to “use 
or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security. . . any manipulative or 
deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission 
my prescribe.” Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78(j)(b) (emphasis added). The “in 
connection with” requirement of Section 10(b), as it relates to primary liability amongst 
secondary actors, comes into play when determining what statements or omissions, or the 
documents that house them, can be considered to be issued in connection with the purchase or 
sale of securities. See Adam v. Silicon Valley Bancshares, 884 F.Supp. 1398, 1401-02 (N.D. Cal. 
1995). 
 57. See Adam, 884 F.Supp. at 1398. 
 58. See id. at 1401. 
 59. Id. at 1399. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 1402. The Adam court rejected the argument Deloitte & Touche advanced to limit 
their liability that “after Central Bank, the only documents which can be the basis for accountant 
liability are ‘selling documents,’ i.e. documents used by either sellers or purchasers of securities 
to effect a particular sales transaction.” The Adam court instead “adhere[d] to the interpretation of 
the ‘in connection with’ requirement previously held by the Ninth Circuit. . . .[under which] the 
non-Prospectus statements satisfy the “in connection with” requirement and may be a basis for 
holding [Deloitte & Touche] primarily liable under 10(b).” Id. 
 62. See Adam, 884 F.Supp. at 1401-02. 
 63. McGann v. Ernst & Young, 102 F.3d 390 (9th Cir. 1996). 
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violating Section 10(b).  There, the defendant, “E[rnst] & Y[oung,] knew that 
[their client] would include its audit opinion”64 in its annual report. The court 
went on to state that “[w]hile an outside accounting firm might be blameless 
where it had no reason to know that its clients would use its audit report to sell 
securities, or where it instructed its client not to release the report to the 
public,” such was not the case at hand.65 
The very role of the secondary actor, inherent in his or her profession, at 
times plays a part in the comprehensive standard the Ninth Circuit espouses.66 
In Flecker v. Hollywood Entertainment Corp., the district court of Oregon 
found that plaintiffs had established a claim for primary liability under Section 
10(b) against the underwriters of the defendant corporation, not based upon 
any particular act or omission, but upon the relationship the underwriters had 
with the primary violator.67 The court found “that the defendants’ roles as 
analysts, investment bankers and business advisors with extensive contacts 
with Hollywood defendants, superior access to non-public information and 
participation in both drafting and decision-making is sufficient to establish a 
triable primary liability claim under [Section] 10(b).”68 Similarly, in Cooper v. 
Pickett,69 the defendant accounting firm of Deloitte & Touche was held liable 
under Section 10(b) and Rule 10(b)(5) because they knowingly certified false 
and misleading financial statements of their client Merisel.70 In Cooper, the 
court held that plaintiff stock purchasers adequately stated a securities fraud 
claim against Deloitte & Touche based on the allegation that the accountants 
“knowingly certified financial statements including the false revenue 
figures.”71 Furthermore, the court held the defendant underwriters and their 
analysts liable for Section 10(b) violations of making false statements in light 
of their purported access to inside information arising from their close 
relationship with the issuer.72 Finally, the Cooper court expanded the standard 
for imposing primary liability upon secondary actors by accepting plaintiff’s 
complaint which alleged that defendants participated in a direct scheme to 
defraud.73 Differentiating this scheme to defraud from conspiracy, the court 
noted that securities fraud liability may be “based on allegations that a group of 
defendants acted together to violate the securities law, as long as each 
 
 64. Id. at 397. 
 65. Id. 
 66. See Flecker v. Hollywood Entertainment Corp., 1997 WL 269488 (D.Or. Feb. 12, 1997); 
Cooper v. Pickett, 137 F.3d 616 (9th Cir. 1997). 
 67. Flecker, 1997 WL 269488, at *7. 
 68. Id. at *9. 
 69. Cooper, 137 F.3d at 616. 
 70. See id. at 629. 
 71. See id. 
 72. See id. 
 73. Id. at 624. 
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defendant committed a manipulative or deceptive act in furtherance of the 
scheme.”74 
C. The Second Circuit’s “Bright Line” Standard 
Unsatisfied with the expansive scope of liability espoused by the Ninth 
Circuit, other courts, primarily those in the Second Circuit, have adopted a 
more limited standard of liability.75 This “bright line”76 standard imposes 
liability on secondary actors only when they have actually made a fraudulent 
misstatement or omission and such a misstatement or omission can be 
attributed to them.77 
In one of the earlier cases to come out of the Second Circuit, In re MTC 
Elec. Tech. Shareholders Litig. (“MTC”),78 a class of shareholders filed suit 
against the underwriters and accountants of the primary defendant, MTC 
Electronic Technologies Co., Ltd., for violations of Section 10(b) and Rule 
10(b)(5).79 The MTC court refused to impose primary liability upon the 
underwriters for the misrepresentations made in the MTC prospectus, where 
 
 74. Cooper, 137 F.3d at 624. The Cooper court stated: “The complaint does not allege a 
conspiracy, however, as a separate cause of action. Instead, it alleges a “scheme” in which 
Merisel and the other defendants directly participated, tracking the language of Rule 10(b)(5)(a), 
which makes it unlawful for any person “[t]o employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud.” 
Id. 
 75. See e.g., In re MTC Electronic Tech. Shareholders Litig., 898 F.Supp. 974, 987 
(E.D.N.Y. 1995) (“[I]f Central Bank is to have any real meaning, a defendant must actually make 
a false or misleading statement in order to be held liable under Section 10(b).”); In re JWP Inc. 
Sec. Litig., 928 F.Supp. 1239 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Phillips v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 933 F.Supp. 
303 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), aff’d, 108 F.3d 1370 (2d Cir. 1997); Shapiro v. Cantor, 123 F.3d 717 (2d 
Cir. 1997); Wright v. Ernst & Young, 152 F.3d 169 (2d Cir. 1998). 
 76. The “bright line” terminology was first introduced in Anixter v. Home-Stake Prod. Co., 
77 F.3d 1215 (10th  Cir. 1996), a case outside of the Second Circuit which espoused the idea that 
primary liability may only be imposed upon secondary actors when the secondary actor 
“themselves [made] a false or misleading statement (or omission) that they know or should know 
will reach potential investors.” Id. at 1227. Interestingly, the Anixter court characterized this 
approach as “far from a bright line,” but expressly rejected the standard adopted in the Ninth 
Circuit stating the Second Circuit’s rule “provides more guidance to litigants than a rule allowing 
liability to attach to an accountant or other outside professional who provided “significant” or 
“substantial” assistance to the representations of others.” Id. at 1227. Since the time of the Anixter 
decision, the standard adopted by the Second Circuit has commonly been referred to as a “bright 
line” rule. 
 77. See, e.g., Shapiro, 123 F.3d at 720 (quoting MTC Elec., 898 F.Supp. at 987, where the 
court stated that “if Central Bank is to have any real meaning, a defendant must actually make a 
false or misleading statement in order to be held liable under Section 10(b).”). See also Wright v. 
Ernst & Young, 152 F.3d at 175  (“[A] secondary actor cannot incur primary liability under the 
Act for a statement not attributed to the actor.”). 
 78. MTC Elec., 898 F.Supp. at 974. 
 79. Id. at 978. 
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the underwriters had only participated in its drafting and circulation.80 
Cognizant of the two approaches towards imposing liability that had developed 
after Central Bank, the court stated: 
[I]f Central Bank is to have any real meaning, a defendant must actually make 
a false or misleading statement in order to be held liable under Section 10(b). 
Anything short of such conduct is merely aiding and abetting, and no matter 
how substantial that aid may be, it is not enough to trigger liability under 
Section 10(b).81 
While the MTC court held the defendant accountant liable for a primary 
violation of Section 10(b), it did so only because the accountant was personally 
responsible for certain misstatements and omissions.82 The court found that 
plaintiffs had sufficiently stated a claim against the accountant as a primary 
violator, after alleging the accountant had “materially misstated MTC’s results 
of operations and net income, outstanding shares and options and the nature 
and extent of its business, and that [the accountant] materially misrepresented 
that it had performed its audit in accordance with generally accepted auditing 
standards.”83 
Shortly after the MTC decision, two district courts in the Second Circuit 
reinforced the bright line standard by holding that accountants and 
underwriters are only primarily liable for the misrepresentations that they 
actually make under Section 10(b).84 First, the In re JWP Inc. Sec. Litig. court 
refused to impose liability upon the accountants and granted the audit 
committee defendants summary judgment “dismissing the plaintiff’s” §10(b) 
claims to the extent that those claims are based on alleged misrepresentations 
that the audit committee defendants did not make.”85 Second, in Phillips v. 
Kidder, Peabody & Co., the court refused to extend liability upon the 
defendant underwriter, finding that an underwriter who participates in drafting 
the prospectus may be held liable under Section 10(b) only if the underwriter 
“made” the fraudulent misrepresentations contained in the prospectus.86 
In the first case on point to reach the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, 
Shapiro v. Cantor,87 the court reinforced the findings of the lower courts and in 
doing so furthered the application of the bright line standard.88 In Shapiro, 
 
 80. Id. at 987. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at 988. (“[Defendant’s] claim that the plaintiffs have not alleged that it made any 
materially false and misleading statements is incorrect.”). 
 83. MTC Elec., 898 F.Supp. at 988. 
 84. In re JWP Inc. Sec. Litig., 928 F.Supp. 1239 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Phillips v. Kidder, 
Peabody & Co., 933 F.Supp. 303 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), aff’d, 108 F.3d 1370 (2d Cir. 1997). 
 85. JWP Inc., 928 F. Supp at 1256. 
 86. Phillips, 933 F. Supp at 324. 
 87. Shapiro v. Cantor, 123 F.3d 717 (2d Cir. 1997). 
 88. Id. at 720. 
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investors in a limited partnership sued the accounting firm of Touche Ross and 
Co., and its successor in interest, Deloitte & Touche, for violations of Section 
10(b).89 Plaintiff’s claims were “based primarily on the defendant’s failure to 
disclose that David Greenberg—one of the principals—was a convicted 
felon,”90 yet there was “no allegation that the projections [made by defendant] 
misrepresented any financial fact.”91 The court concluded that the defendant 
accounting firm was under no duty to disclose material information under 
Section 10(b) and, therefore, could not be held liable.92 Furthermore, plaintiff’s 
amended complaint alleged that Touche Ross’s specific “participating” role in 
selling interests of their client was only in providing financial projections 
included in the offering memoranda.93 As such, the court refused to extend 
liability stating that “because this is consistent with the role of an accountant, 
and because the plaintiffs otherwise fail to articulate a ‘fiduciary or other 
similar relation of trust and confidence’. . . Touche Ross had no duty to 
disclose.”94 In sum, the court reasoned that plaintiff’s allegations essentially 
constituted aiding and abetting principles and that “[a]llegations of ‘assisting,’ 
‘participating in,’ ‘complicity in’ and similar synonyms used throughout the 
complaint all fall within the prohibitive bar of Central Bank.”95 
More recently, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals decided Wright v. 
Ernst & Young,96 further contracting the standard of liability applicable to 
secondary actors by specifying the time frame within which the misstatement 
or omission must be attributed to the secondary actor in order to hold them 
liable.97 In Wright, a class of investors brought a securities fraud action under 
Section 10(b) against the accounting firm of Ernst & Young, alleging that 
Ernst & Young had violated Section 10(b) by orally approving their client’s 
materially false and misleading financial statements.  The client, BT Office 
Products (“BT”), disseminated the statements to the public through a press 
release.98 The press release, however, stated that the figures contained in the 
financial statements were unaudited and made no reference to Ernst & 
 
 89. Id. at 718-19. 
 90. Id. at 721. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Shapiro, 123 F.3d at 721. 
 93. Id. at 722. 
 94. Id. But cf. Flecker v. Hollywood Entertainment Corp., 1997 WL 269488 at *9 (D.Or. 
Feb. 12, 1997) (This Ninth Circuit case also took into account the very role of the secondary 
actor, inherent in his profession, but used it to impose primary liability, stating “defendant’s roles 
as analysts, investment bankers and business advisors with extensive contacts with Hollywood 
defendants, superior access to non-public information, and participation in both drafting and 
decision-making is sufficient to establish a triable primary liability claim under Section 10(b).”). 
 95. Shapiro, 123 F.3d at 720. 
 96. Wright v. Ernst & Young, 152 F.3d 169 (2d Cir. 1998). 
 97. Id. at 175. 
 98. Id. at 171. 
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Young.99 The court concluded that plaintiffs did not allege primary liability 
against Ernst & Young because Ernst & Young did not directly or indirectly 
communicate misrepresentations to the investors upon which they would have 
relied in making their investment decision.100 
The Wright court noted that although there is “no requirement that the 
alleged violator directly communicate misrepresentations to [investors] for 
primary liability to attach,”101 a “secondary actor cannot incur primary liability 
under the Act [of 1934] for a statement not attributed to the actor at the time of 
its dissemination.”102 Thus, in order for liability to attach, the 
misrepresentation must be attributed to that specific actor at the time of public 
dissemination, in advance of the investment decision, which was not present in 
the case at hand.103 Additionally, the court reaffirmed the “bright line” notion 
that secondary actors may not be held primarily liable under Section 10(b) 
unless they made the material misstatement or omission on which the 
purchaser or seller of securities relies.  Furthermore, the Wright court 
reaffirmed that the secondary actor “may no longer be held primarily liable 
under §10(b) for mere knowledge and assistance in the fraud.”104 
D. Decisions Outside of the Ninth and Second Circuits 
Although the primary split between the standards exists in the Ninth and 
Second Circuits, courts throughout all circuits have had to address the issue of 
what type of conduct constitutes a primary violation of Section 10(b) amongst 
secondary actors.105 No single standard has been adopted by any particular 
circuit, and, in fact, the decisions seem to coincide with either the Ninth 
Circuit’s standard,106 that of substantial participation,” or with the Second 
Circuit’s standard,107 that the secondary actor make a misstatement or omission 
attributable to him or her. A discussion of these cases follows. 
 
 99. Id. at 172. 
 100. Id. at 173-74. 
 101. Wright, 152 F.3d at 175 (quoting Anixter v. Home-Stake Prod. Co., 77 F.3d 1215, 1226 
(10th Cir. 1996)). 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at 172 (“The press release also stated . . . that the figures were ‘unaudited’ and it 
made no mention of Ernst & Young.”). 
 104. Id. at 176. 
 105. See, e.g., Dublin Sec., Inc. v. Hurd, 197 B.R. 66 (S.D. Ohio), aff’d, 133 F.3d 377 (6th 
Cir. 1997); Anixter, 77 F.3d at 1215; Trust Co. of La. v. N.N.P., Inc., 104 F.3d 1478 (5th Cir. 
1997). 
 106. See, e.g., Cashman v. Coopers & Lybrand, 877 F.Supp. 425 (N.D. Ill. 1995); Dublin 
Sec., 197 B.R. at 66. 
 107. See, e.g., Anixter, 77 F.3d at 1215; Vosgerichian v. Commodore Int’l, 862 F.Supp. 1371 
(E.D. Pa. 1994); In re Kendall Square Research Corp. Sec. Litig., 868 F.Supp. 26 (D. Mass. 
1994); Trust Co. of La. v. N.N.P., Inc., 104 F.3d 1478 (5th Cir. 1997). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2000] PRIMARY LIABILITY AMONGST SECONDARY ACTORS 1621 
1. Decisions Coinciding with the Ninth Circuit’s Standard 
Shortly after the Central Bank decision, a district court in Illinois was 
faced with the issue of what type of conduct constitutes primary liability 
amongst secondary actors, and more particularly, amongst accountants.108 In 
Cashman v. Coopers & Lybrand, shareholders and debenture holders brought a 
Section 10(b) action against the accounting firm of Coopers & Lybrand.  
Plaintiffs alleged that Coopers & Lybrand concealed and misrepresented 
material facts of their client, Stotler Group, Inc. (“Stotler”), during Stotler’s 
transition from a partnership to a public corporation.109 The Cashman court 
concluded that plaintiffs’ allegations, most of which were framed in terms of 
the “substantial participation”110 by Coopers & Lybrand in the scheme to 
defraud, were sufficient to allege “that Coopers played a central role in the 
drafting and formation of the alleged misstatements which the Stotler 
Partnership incorporated into its Prospectus.”111 Thus, in many respects, the 
Cashman decision mirrored the ZZZZ Best and Software Toolworks decisions 
in the Ninth Circuit because in all three cases, liability was framed according 
to the defendant’s “substantial participation” or “central role” in the primary 
violator’s misstatements or omission. 
In the Sixth Circuit, attorneys may be held liable for primary violations 
under Section 10(b) for their participation in securities fraud where their direct 
involvement was in the management and control of the company when the 
alleged fraud occurred.112 The In re Dublin Sec. Inc. court held that “the 
defrauded investors . . . have direct avenues of relief against the defendant 
attorneys”113 despite the fact that the only allegation was that “the attorney 
defendants knew or should have known of the illegal nature of the activities of 
Dublin Securities, but failed to advise Dublin Securities of the illegality of the 
activities.”114 The reasoning behind the court’s imposition of liability in Dublin 
is reminiscent of the Flecker and Cooper rationale that one’s role or 
relationship with a client is a substantial factor in determining liability under 
the comprehensive standard espoused by the Ninth Circuit. Just as the Dublin 
court imposes primary liability upon the defendant attorneys due, at least in 
 
 108. Cashman v. Coopers & Lybrand, 877 F.Supp. 425 (N.D. Ill. 1995). 
 109. See id. at 429. 
 110. Id. at 432-33 (“During its substantial participation in the preparation of the Prospectus, 
Coopers recklessly misrepresented to the partners . . . [the] particular results [that] would follow 
from the “taking public” Transaction. Coopers’ substantial participation consisted of: (1) issuing 
reports/statements of financial condition and financial statement schedules for the Stotler 
Partnership . . . and (2) allowing the Stotler Partnership to rely on these reports . . . .”). 
 111. Id. at 432. 
 112. See Dublin Sec. Inc. v. Hurd, 197 B.R. 66 (S.D. Ohio 1996), aff’d 133 F.3d 377 (6th Cir. 
1997). 
 113. Id. at 73. 
 114. Id. at 69. 
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part, to their role as managers of the primary violator, so too did the Flecker 
and Cooper courts impose primary liability upon the secondary actor 
defendants due to their role or relationship with the primary violator client.115 
2. Decisions Coinciding with the Second Circuit’s Standard 
An important case espousing the Second Circuit’s standard and in fact 
relied upon in many of the more recent decisions handed down in the Second 
Circuit, is Anixter v. Home-Stake Prod. Co.116 In Anixter, the Tenth Circuit 
Court of Appeals articulated the bright line standard, stating that in order for 
accountants to be held liable under Section 10(b) “they must themselves make 
a false or misleading statement (or omission) that they know or should know 
will reach potential investors.”117 In addition, the Tenth Circuit expressly 
rejected the Ninth Circuit’s standard, stating that “to the extent these [Ninth 
Circuit] cases allow liability to attach without requiring a representation to be 
made by [a] defendant, and reformulate the ‘substantial assistance’ element of 
aiding and abetting liability into primary liability, they do not comport with 
Central Bank of Denver.”118 Finally, the court stated that the standard Anixter 
adopted “provides more guidance to litigants than a rule allowing liability to 
attach to an accountant or other outside professional who provided ‘significant’ 
or ‘substantial’ assistance to the representations of others.”119 
In Vosgerichian v. Commodore Int’l, a district court in Pennsylvania 
refused to extend primary liability upon the defendant auditing firm of Arthur 
Andersen. The firm allegedly assisted its client, a computer manufacturing 
firm, in perpetrating securities fraud by advising or concurring, guiding and 
approving the manufacturer’s decisions regarding the alleged 
misrepresentations.120 The court concluded that “plaintiff’s allegations . . . 
[we]re insufficient to support any claim other than one for aider and abettor 
liability, which has now been abolished.”121 Thus, the court’s finding stated 
that an accounting or auditing firm that merely advises or gives guidance to a 
client, who in turn allegedly makes a fraudulent misrepresentation, is 
 
 115. Id. at 66. See Flecker v. Hollywood Entertainment Corp., 1997 WL 269448, at *9  (D.Or. 
Feb. 12, 1997), where the defendant underwriters were held liable due to their “role as analysts, 
investment bankers and business advisors with extensive contacts with Hollywood defendants”; 
see also Cooper v. Pickett, 137 F.3d at 629 (9th Cir. 1997), where the defendant underwriters 
were held liable due to their purported access to inside information and close relationship with the 
primary violator issuer. 
 116. Anixter v. Home-Stake Prod. Co., 77 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir. 1996). 
 117. Id. at 1226. 
 118. Id. at 1226 n.10. 
 119. Id. at 1227. 
 120. See Vosgerichian v. Commodore Int’l, 862 F.Supp. 1371, 1378 (E.D. Pa. 1994) 
(Plaintiff’s allegations included that “Commodore ‘consulted Arthur Andersen’ and that ‘AA 
advised or concurred with Commodore’s decision[s]. . . .”). 
 121. Id. at 1378. 
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insufficient for imposing Section 10(b) liability.122 Such a holding is clearly in 
accordance with the Second Circuit’s bright line standard. 
Another instance of a court applying the Second Circuit’s bright line 
standard is In re Kendall Square Research Corp. Sec. Litig.123 The Kendall 
Square court refused to impose liability upon the defendant accounting firm of 
Price Waterhouse, whose only role was to review and approve the client’s 
financial statements and prospectuses.124 The court stated that the “activities do 
not rise to the level of actionable conduct set forth by the Supreme Court in 
Central Bank. . . .”125 The court reiterated an important aspect of the bright line 
standard, that of attribution, by stating “[b]ecause Price Waterhouse did not 
actually engage in the reporting of the financial statements and Prospectuses, 
but merely reviewed and approved them, the statements are not attributable to 
Price Waterhouse and thus Price Waterhouse cannot be found liable for 
making a material misstatement.”126 
Although the Second Circuit’s standard is narrower than the Ninth 
Circuit’s, it does not follow that secondary actors are always free from liability 
under such a standard.127 In the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals case, Trust Co. 
of La. v. N.N.P. Inc., the court applied the Second Circuit bright line standard, 
yet held an attorney primarily liable for violations of Section 10(b) and Rule 
10(b)(5).128 In Trust Co., an attorney, who was the supposed custodian of 
collateralized certificates, made a material fraudulent omission by not 
disclosing that he did not hold the certificates, but only the assignments of 
interests in the certificates.129 The court, in finding the defendant attorney 
liable, stated that the attorney “made material misstatements in connection with 
the purchase of a security. [Plaintiffs] justifiably relied on those material 
misstatements and that reliance proximately caused injury to [the plaintiff].”130 
 
 122. The Vosgerichian court summarized this proposition best by stating that “Plaintiff’s 
allegations against [defendant] do not go beyond allegations that [defendant] assisted [primary 
violator] in perpetrating securities fraud and are thus not cognizable.” Vosgerichian, 862 F.Supp. 
at 1378. 
 123. In re Kendall Square Research Corp. Sec. Litig., 868 F.Supp. 26 (D.Mass. 1994). 
 124. Id.  Recognizing that defendant’s sole role was to provide review and approval, the 
Kendall Square court stated “[t]he Court rules that the CAC’s allegations that Price Waterhouse 
reviewed and approved the quarterly financial statements and the Prospectuses do not constitute 
the making of a material misstatement; at most, the conduct constitutes aiding and abetting and is 
thus not cognizable under Section 10(b).” Id. at 28. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. 
 127. See e.g., In re MTC Elec. Tech. Shareholders Litig., 898 F.Supp. 974, 988 (E.D. N.Y. 
1995) (defendant accountants held primarily liable for misrepresentations and omissions they 
personally made). 
 128. Trust Co. of La. v. N.N.P., Inc., 104 F.3d 1478 (5th Cir. 1997). 
 129. Id. at 1482. 
 130. Id. at 1491. 
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As can be seen, both the Ninth and Second Circuits’ standards have 
received support and application from other courts.  However, this Note will 
argue in the following sections that should the Supreme Court chose to 
eliminate the split in the circuits, the Second Circuit’s standard should prevail. 
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE NINTH AND SECOND CIRCUIT STANDARDS 
A. The Ninth Circuit’s Standard: A Lack of Culpability, Reliance, and 
Objectivity 
The Ninth Circuit’s standard, imposing primary liability upon secondary 
actors for their “intricate involvement” or “substantial participation” in the 
material misstatement or omission of the primary violator, is entirely too 
broad. Under such a standard, secondary actors playing only a minor role, such 
as consultant or auditor, are subject to the same consequences as primary 
violators, responsible for actually making the fraudulent misstatement or 
omission. Thus, there exists a great degree of disparity in terms of culpability. 
For example, the accounting firm defendant in Software Toolworks, who 
only “reviewed” and “discussed” their client’s letters, containing the alleged 
fraudulent misstatements, could, like the primary violator, be held primarily 
liable under Section 10(b).131 Ultimately it is the primary violator who made 
the misrepresentation, and as such, it is he or she who should have to pay the 
price. It is important to remember that in the real world of securities disclosure 
counseling, ultimately the decisions and risks concerning what to disclose and 
how to disclose it belong not to the attorney or accountant, but to the client. In 
the end, it is the client, as issuer, who makes the disclosure containing the 
alleged misstatement or omission. Additionally, the administrative feasibility 
of the secondary actor sifting through every aspect of their client’s business in 
order to detect potentially omitted facts would be difficult, if not impossible. 
Another major problem with the Ninth Circuit’s standard is that it 
essentially disregards an essential element of primary liability—that of reliance 
on the part of the plaintiff.132 To illustrate, in ZZZZ Best, the defendant was 
held primarily liable despite the fact that the documents containing the alleged 
misstatements included no indication that defendant Ernst & Young had 
anything to do with them.133 How could the plaintiff investors have relied upon 
Ernst & Young’s substantial participation or intricate involvement in the 
alleged misrepresentation if they did not even know Ernst & Young was 
involved? Although secondary actors, by the very nature of their role, are 
 
 131. See supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
 132. See supra note 34. To reiterate, the generally accepted elements of primary liability 
under Section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5 are: (1) a misrepresentation or omission, (2) of a material fact, (3) 
made with scienter, (4) that plaintiff relied upon, and (5) caused the plaintiff injury. 
 133. See supra note 41 and accompanying text. 
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generally “behind the scenes” participants in the sale and issuance of 
securities, that does not mean that their activities can never result in reliance on 
the part of the plaintiff. However, absent the secondary actor actually making 
the misrepresentation or omission himself, reliance on the part of the plaintiff 
will be difficult to find. 
Along the same lines, the very role of the secondary actor, inherent in his 
or her profession, seems to play a part in the overly-broad standard the Ninth 
Circuit espouses. In Flecker v. Hollywood Entertainment Corp., the defendant 
underwriters were held primarily liable based upon their relationship with the 
primary violator client and their role as investment bankers and business 
advisors, as opposed to participation in any particular misrepresentation or 
omission.134 Similarly, in both Cooper v. Picket135 and In re Dublin Sec. Inc.,136 
the defendants’ relationship with the primary violator client was a major 
consideration in imposing primary liability.  The problem with allowing a 
secondary actor’s role or relationship with the client to factor into the 
determination of whether or not to impose primary liability is that it will likely 
have the adverse effect of discouraging the secondary actor from performing 
their function in an appropriate manner. Furthermore, the imposition of 
liability based upon a professional’s degree of involvement may have the 
practical effect of punishing him or her for professionally responsible behavior. 
The very purpose of engaging securities professionals is to obtain their 
assistance in the preparation of the required disclosure documents, yet a 
professional, assisting the client in preparation of such documents, may 
thereby be subject to liability under the Ninth Circuit’s standard. 
Consequently, lawyers, although advisors by nature, may be hesitant to offer 
advice to clients. Worse yet, lawyers may even hesitate to enter into 
transactions with a client involved in the sale or purchase of securities, for fear 
of facing primary liability under Section 10(b)/Rule 10(b)(5).  Likewise, 
accountants may be apprehensive to properly audit or even enter into an audit 
relationship with clients they fear are at risk for committing a fraudulent 
misrepresentation or omission. In the end, this will only disserve the investing 
public, the intended target of protection under Section 10(b). 
A final flaw in the “substantial participation” or “intricate involvement” 
standard is that it lacks objectivity, a concern the Central Bank court expressly 
deemed undesirable.137 Under such a loose standard there is no threshold 
amount of involvement or participation necessary before imposing primary 
liability upon secondary actors. For example, in Software Toolworks Inc., the 
defendants were held liable for merely “review and discussion” of the 
 
 134. See supra notes 67 and 68 and accompanying text. 
 135. See supra note 72 and accompanying text. 
 136. See supra note 114 and accompanying text. 
 137. Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 511 U.S. 164, 188 (1994). 
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materials containing the alleged misstatements.138 At the other end of the 
spectrum, the defendant accounting firm in Cooper v. Pickett was held 
primarily liable for knowingly certifying false and misleading financial 
statements of their client.139 
These seemingly inconsistent impositions of liability provide secondary 
actors with no gauge of what type or amount of participation or involvement 
confers liability. For example, an attorney, assisting a client in preparing 
disclosure documents, would have no way of knowing whether his or her 
efforts amounted to such a substantial or intricate role in the creation of the 
disclosure that the attorney would be primarily liable, rather than just an 
advisor or scrivener. Furthermore, under the Ninth Circuit’s standard, Central 
Bank could be rendered toothless by permitting a plaintiff, who essentially 
drafted an aider/abettor complaint, to simply amend the complaint on the same 
set of facts to allege primary liability. 
Despite all of its problems, there are some benefits to the Ninth Circuit’s 
standard. For instance, the wide standard of liability it imposes undoubtedly 
alerts secondary actors to the possibility of primary liability, which may, in 
turn, lead to better and more thorough disclosure from the client to the 
investing public. Additionally, the expansiveness of the Ninth Circuit’s 
standard would likely allow a greater number of aggrieved plaintiffs to get 
their day in court. Unfortunately, however, the benefits of the “substantial 
participation” or “intricate involvement” standard are far outweighed by the 
standard’s flaws, which are not present in the Second Circuit’s standard. 
B. The Second Circuit’s Standard: A Bright Line 
The Second Circuit’s standard, though not infallible, seems to alleviate the 
aforementioned problems related to the Ninth Circuit’s standard. By imposing 
primary liability upon secondary actors only when they have actually made the 
material misstatement or omission and such misstatement or omission is 
attributed to them at the time of dissemination, the problems regarding 
culpability, reliance and lack of objectivity disappear. 
The “bright line” standard espoused by the Second Circuit imposes 
primary liability upon secondary actors in the same fashion it imposes liability 
upon primary actors— that is both may be found liable under Section 
10(b)/Rule 10(b)(5) if they make a material misstatement or omission.140  For 
example, not only was the primary violator liable in In re MTC Elec. Tech. 
 
 138. In re Software Toolworks Inc. Litig., 50 F.3d at 628 n.3; see also note 48 and 
accompanying text and note 131 and accompanying text. 
 139. See supra note 71 and accompanying text. 
 140. When both primary and secondary actors are held liable for the material misstatement or 
omission, the difficulty of determining who actually made the disclosure is eliminated, thereby 
decreasing the chances of a “he said, she said” argument. 
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Shareholders Litig., but the accountant who had personally made material 
misstatements was also held liable.141 
On the contrary, if only the primary actor made the material misstatement 
or omission, while the secondary actor merely participated in some other facet 
of the transaction without making the misstatement or omission, the primary 
violator will be subject to liability and the secondary actor will not. For 
instance, while the primary violator in Kendall Square was found liable under 
Section 10(b), defendant Price Waterhouse, who “merely reviewed and 
approved” the financial statements housing the alleged misstatements, was 
not.142 Thus the disparity in culpability found in the application of the Ninth 
Circuit’s standard is not present under the Second Circuit’s standard. 
Directly related to the culpability issue is the issue of objectivity. Under 
the “bright line” standard, a secondary actor is primarily liable under Section 
10(b)/Rule 10(b)(5) when he or she makes a material misstatement or 
omission, and such misstatement or omission can be attributed to the 
secondary actor at the time of dissemination. Thus, whether the secondary 
actor makes one misstatement or one thousand misstatements, he or she will be 
subject to primary liability, assuming the misstatement is attributable to the 
actor at the time of dissemination. There is no minimum threshold 
determination involved in the Second Circuit’s standard— if a secondary actor 
made a misstatement or omission, not participated in making one or was 
intricately involved in the making of one, he or she may be subject to liability. 
Unlike the Ninth Circuit’s standard, subjectivity does not enter into the 
imposition of liability under the “bright line” rule. Furthermore, the Second 
Circuit’s standard provides predictability for secondary actors. To reiterate, it 
is irrelevant whether the secondary actor “substantially participated” in making 
his own misstatement or was “intricately involved” in making it. If the 
secondary actor made a misstatement, substantially, intricately or otherwise, he 
is subject to liability under Section 10(b)/Rule 10(b)(5). 
Furthermore, the second prong of the standard, “attributable to the actor at 
the time of dissemination,” abates any doubts regarding reliance on the part of 
the plaintiff. Similar to the facts in ZZZZ Best,143 the documents containing the 
alleged misstatement in Wright v. Ernst & Young made no reference to the 
secondary actor defendant Ernst & Young.144 Unlike ZZZZ Best, however, the 
Wright court refused to impose liability upon Ernst & Young, recognizing that 
plaintiff investors could not have possibly relied upon the alleged 
misstatements, which moreover, were made by the primary rather than 
 
 141. See supra notes 82 and 83 and accompanying text. 
 142. See supra notes 124-26 and accompanying text. 
 143. See supra note 133. 
 144. See supra note 99 and accompanying text. 
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secondary actor.145  The Wright court concluded “a secondary actor cannot 
incur primary liability under the Act for a statement not attributed to the actor 
at the time of its dissemination.”146 Thus, under the Second Circuit’s “bright 
line” standard, reliance on the part of the plaintiff, an essential element of 
primary liability, remains intact. 
Finally, the Ninth Circuit’s practice of using the secondary actor’s role or 
relationship with the client as a factor in determining primary liability is 
nonexistent in the Second Circuit’s standard. In one of the few Second Circuit 
cases that mentions the secondary actor’s role, Shapiro v. Cantor,147 it worked 
to the secondary actor’s benefit, not detriment, as it would in the Ninth Circuit. 
In Shapiro, the court refused to impose liability upon the defendant 
accountants.  Plaintiff’s allegations were not that the defendant had actually 
made a material misstatement or omission, but rather that liability should be 
imposed based upon defendant’s specific “participating” role in selling 
interests of their clients, despite the fact that defendant’s only role was in 
providing financial projections included in the offering memoranda.148 The 
court reasoned that “because [defendant’s actions were] consistent with the 
role of an accountant,”149 imposing primary liability would not be proper. 
V. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT’S 
STANDARD 
Not only does the Second Circuit’s standard alleviate the aforementioned 
problems associated with the “substantial participation” or “intricate 
involvement” standard, it also proves to be superior to the Ninth Circuit’s 
standard under policy considerations. 
The Ninth Circuit’s standard for imposing primary liability, which does not 
substantially differ from the now nonexistent standard formerly used to impose 
secondary liability upon aiders and abettors, presents many of the same policy 
concerns Central Bank addressed when eliminating aider and abettor 
liability.150 Similar to the standard previously employed for imposing 
secondary liability upon aiders and abettors, the Ninth Circuit’s standard 
“exacts costs that may disserve the goals of fair dealing and efficiency in 
securities markets.”151 As explained earlier, these costs might derive from the 
creation of confusion among those who provide services to issuers “in an area 
 
 145. See supra notes 99-102 and accompanying text. 
 146. Wright v. Ernst & Young, 152 F.3d 169, 175 (2d Cir. 1998). 
 147. See supra notes 94 and 95 and accompanying text. 
 148. See supra note 93. 
 149. Shapiro v. Cantor, 123 F.3d 717, 722 (2d Cir. 1997). 
 150. These policy concerns, as identified in Central Bank, include the lack of predictability, 
the settlement pressures imposed by fact based liability standards, and the risk of vexatious 
litigation. See Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 511 U.S. 164, 188-89 (1994). 
 151. Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 188. 
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of law that demands certainty and predictability.”152  Furthermore, adherence to 
the Ninth Circuit’s standard would expose a myriad of parties to the danger of 
vexatious litigation “different in degree and kind from that which accompanies 
litigation in general.”153 
Adopting the more stringent standard that the Second Circuit espouses 
would eliminate unnecessary litigation by plaintiffs who are merely searching 
for deep pockets. The unfortunate motivation for some plaintiffs seeking to 
impose primary liability upon secondary actors is merely a search for deep 
pockets. Assume, for instance, that a start-up company, with little capital, 
made a fraudulent misrepresentation or omission in their initial public offering 
documents. An aggrieved plaintiff, aware of the fact that they will be afforded 
little relief from the financially infirm primary violator, may look to impose 
primary liability upon the secondary actor, say a “Big Five,” financially sound, 
accounting firm. The accounting firm that did not actually make the 
misstatement or omission itself, may be held liable under a looser standard 
than that which the Second Circuit imposes, and thus allow the plaintiff to 
reach into its deep pockets.154 The “bright line” standard, which would not 
impose liability upon the accounting firm absent a finding that it actually made 
a material misstatement or omission and that it could be attributed to the firm 
at the time of dissemination, prevents such an unjust result. 
Furthermore, the Second Circuit’s standard would decrease unnecessary 
litigation overall, because it does not allow plaintiffs to name as defendant 
every secondary actor involved in a transaction where fraud is present in 
connection with the sale and purchase of securities. Only when the plaintiffs 
relied upon the secondary actor’s misstatement or omission at the time of 
dissemination can such an actor be legitimately named a defendant subject to 
primary liability under Section 10(b)/Rule 10(b)(5). 
Additionally, if, as under the Ninth Circuit’s standard, secondary actors 
such as lawyers or accountants are at risk of being held primarily liable for 
substantial participation or intricate involvement in their client’s statements 
containing material misstatements or omissions to the shareholders, then such 
secondary actors will likely step back from the process. Not only will the 
outside investors, who benefit from the involvement of outside professionals in 
the preparation process, be harmed if this results, but so too will the clients. 
Ironically, it is the shareholders who will ultimately pay the price for increased 
legal and accounting fees if attorneys and accountants are forced to “over-
lawyer” and “over-account” disclosure advice. 
 
 152. Id. (quoting Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 652 (1988)). 
 153. Id. (quoting Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 755 (1975)). 
 154. All of this relates to the court’s worry in Central Bank that creating Rule 10(b)(5) 
liability for professionals in such cases would make it difficult for “newer and smaller 
companies” to obtain advise from professionals. See Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 189. 
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On the other hand, under the “bright line” standard, secondary actors such 
as lawyers and accountants will not constantly have the threat of liability 
hanging over their head. The predictability that the Second Circuit’s standard 
provides secondary actors— that is, they need not worry that they will face 
Section 10(b)/Rule 10(b)(5) liability unless they actually make a material 
misstatement or omission— will not impair their ability to participate in the 
disclosure process. This will ultimately result in better and more thorough 
disclosure, which benefits the intended targets of Section 10(b), the investors. 
A final point in favor of the Second Circuit’s “bright line” standard, which 
essentially argues that the scope of liability for secondary actors should be 
drawn narrowly, is that it is aligned with the current trend to limit securities 
fraud litigation overall. For example, the Private Securities Litigation Reform 
Act (“PSLRA”),155 passed in 1995 over President Clinton’s veto, contains a 
variety of procedural and substantive reforms designed to reduce the volume of 
private securities fraud litigation, mainly class actions, and to curb litigation 
abuse.156 Such reforms include a heightened pleading standard, a safe harbor 
provision for forward looking statements, and the creation of a lead plaintiff to 
monitor litigation decision making.157 Additionally, the Securities Litigation 
Uniform Standards Act of 1998 limited securities fraud litigation in the federal 
courts and tangentially in state courts.158 The effect of the statute was to 
preempt state law causes of action for fraud and essentially leave federal 
liability as the exclusive remedy for investors. While the Second Circuit’s 
standard seems to intimate this trend to decrease securities fraud litigation, it 
does not follow that meritorious claims will be overlooked. Rather, the “bright 
line” standard will capture wrongdoers and impose liability in proportion to 
culpability. When the secondary actor has actually made a material 
misstatement or omission and it is attributable to him or her at the time of 
dissemination, liability will be imposed. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The permissible scope of professional liability for secondary actors will 
continue to be tested under a variety of factual circumstances in the coming 
years. Unfortunately, until a case arises in which the Supreme Court grants 
certiorari to determine which standard for imposing primary liability upon 
secondary actors should endure, the split between the Ninth and Second 
 
 155. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified in 
scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
 156. See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No.105-353, 112 Stat. 
3227 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
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Circuits will remain. Yet when the time comes for the issue to be finally 
determined, the Second Circuit’s “bright line” standard should prevail. 
One of the expressed goals of the Supreme Court in Central Bank was to 
end the confusion and uncertainty inherent in the concept of secondary liability 
for securities fraud violations.159 This goal can only be achieved by imposing 
liability while staying within the confines of primary liability. The Second 
Circuit’s “bright line” standard, which deters secondary actors from 
participating in fraudulent activities, serves this goal better than the Ninth 
Circuit’s “intricate involvement” or “substantial participation” standard. Judge 
Gleeson, in In re MTC Elec. Tech. Shareholders Litig., summed up the 
superiority of the “bright line” standard best by  stating that if Central Bank is 
to have any meaning at all, “a defendant must actually make a false or 
misleading statement in order to be held liable under Section 10(b). Anything 
short of such conduct is merely aiding and abetting, and no matter how 
substantial that aid may be, it is not enough to trigger liability under Section 
10(b).”160 
In the end, it appears that the real answer to the question of what type of 
activity constitutes primary liability amongst secondary actors can be found in 
Central Bank itself. To state a claim for securities fraud under Section 
10(b)/Rule 10(b)(5), the plaintiff must plead that each defendant, secondary 
actor or otherwise, committed all the traditional elements of the wrong: (1) a 
misrepresentation or omission, (2) of a material fact, (3) made with scienter, 
(4) that plaintiff relied upon, (5) causing injury to the plaintiff.161 The Second 
Circuit’s “bright line” standard, unlike the Ninth Circuit’s “substantial 
participation” or “intricate involvement” standard, encompasses all five 
traditional elements of primary liability. Central Bank did nothing to change 
the elements of primary liability under Section 10(b), it merely eliminated the 
aiding and abetting cause of action as means of imposing liability. If plaintiff 
cannot prove a secondary actor defendant has met all five of the elements, then 
the plaintiff has no cause of action under Section 10(b)/Rule 10(b)(5), 
regardless of whether defendant is a primary or secondary actor. 
MARY M. WYNNE 
 
 159. See Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 511 U.S. 164, 165 (1994). 
 160. In re MTC Elec. Tech. Shareholders Litig., 898 F.Supp. 974, 987 (E.D.N.Y. 1995). 
 161. See supra notes 34 and 132. Although the court in Central Bank did not spell out the 
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